

REMARKS

Claims 1-27 are pending. Claims 1, 12, 19, and 25 are independent claims. No claims are amended or canceled herein.

In the Office Action, all pending claims were rejected as allegedly unpatentable over U.S. 5,864,863 ("Burrows") in view of U.S. 5,935,210 ("Stark"). For the reasons stated below, Applicant respectfully traverses the pending claim rejections, and submits that all pending claims are in condition for allowance. Applicant believes that the present paper provides a complete response to the present rejections. Further, should it be necessary in future papers, Applicant reserves the right to set forth other reasons supporting the patentability of his claims, and in particular to argue for the separate patentability of dependent claims not specifically addressed herein.

Argument

I. Claims 1-18

A. "converting at least a portion of a secure audiovisual object into index information . . ."

Independent claim 1 recites in part "converting at least a portion of a secure audiovisual object into index information." The Examiner alleged that Burrows teaches this recitation of claim 1. (Office Action, page 6.) However, Burrows says nothing at all about converting audiovisual objects into index information. Burrows simply discloses that web pages can include multimedia content. (Burrows, 4: 30-38.) Burrows also describes how a user may use a web browser to locate and retrieve web pages that include multimedia content, typically using a universal resource locator (URL). (Burrows, 4: 45-55.) However, at least because Burrows fails to teach or suggest "converting at least a portion of a secure audiovisual object into index information," much less does Burrows teach or suggest indexing secure objects at all, the rejection of claim 1 should be withdrawn.

B. “converting at least a portion of a secure audiovisual object into index information . . .” and “reading index information that is associated with a secure graphical or audio object . . .”

Independent claim 1 recites in part “converting at least a portion of a secure audiovisual object into index information . . . wherein the secure audiovisual object is secure in that search engine systems do not have full access to the secure audiovisual object.” Independent claim 12 recites in part to “reading index information that is associated with a secure graphical or audio object . . . wherein search engine systems do not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object.” The Examiner’s rejection of claim 12, which was applied to claim 1 (Office Action, page 6), stated that Burrows teaches “reading index information that is associated with a secure graphical or audio object.” (Office Action, page 3.) However, Burrows says nothing at all about secure objects, much less indexing secure objects. At most, Burrows teaches that web pages “can encode multimedia items including digitized graphic, audio or video components.” (Burrows, 7: 9-10.) At least because Burrows fails to teach or suggest “a secure audiovisual object,” much less indexing secure objects, the rejection of claims 1 and 12 should be withdrawn.

Further, the Examiner acknowledged that “Burrows does not specifically teach [that] the search engine systems do not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object,” and cited Stark to compensate for the acknowledged deficiency of Burrows. In fact, Stark has nothing at all to do with access to secure audiovisual, or graphical or audio, objects as recited in claims 1 and 12, and certainly does not teach or suggest “that search engine systems do not have full access to the secure audiovisual object.”

Stark teaches no more than that a “spider” used by a search engine to index websites may honor “the robot exclusion protocol.” (Stark, 9: 34-35.) According to the robot exclusion protocol, a website may maintain a file, “robot.txt,” indicating resources within the website that the spider should not index. (Stark, 9: 37-40.) However, as Stark acknowledges, whether a spider “honors the robot exclusion protocol” is totally within the discretion of the spider’s programmer. (See Stark, 9: 34-44; see also Exhibit A attached hereto: Wikipedia, Robots Exclusion Standard, January 15, 2007.) That is, under the robot exclusion protocol, a search engine has full access to all resources listed in the robot.txt file,

but honors a request, made by listing a resource in the robot.txt file, not to access the resource. Therefore, to the extent that Stark is relevant at all, Stark teaches away from claim 1 because Stark suggests that a search engine would have full access to resources within a website. And in any event, Stark clearly does not teach or suggest “that search engine systems do not have full access to the secure audiovisual [or graphical or audio] object.”

In short, at least because (1) neither Burrows nor Stark teaches or suggests a “secure audiovisual object,” and (2) Stark does not teach or suggest “that search engine systems do not have full access to” any resources, much less a “secure audiovisual object,” claims 1 and 12 are allowable over the prior art of record. Therefore, for at least the foregoing reasons, the rejections of claims 1 and 12, and also claims 2-11 and 13-18 depending therefrom respectively, should be withdrawn.

C. “obfuscating at least a portion of the index information . . .”

Independent claims 1 and 12 recite in part “obfuscating at least a portion of the index information so that the intelligibility of the contents of the index information is reduced.” The Examiner contended that Burrows anticipates this recitation by teaching that the size of an index can be reduced by removing commonly occurring English words such as “a,” “the,” “of,” and “in.” (Office Action, page 3.) In fact, the compression scheme disclosed by Burrows simply teaches storing frequently occurring words in common locations in an index because “compressing the locations minimizes the number of bytes consumed to express the numerous locations of common words which appear close to each other.” (Burrows, 11: 48-62.) Clearly, Burrows’ object is not “obfuscating at least a portion of the index information,” but is rather to preserve – and yet store efficiently – as much index information as possible. That is, Burrows does not teach “that the intelligibility of the contents of the index information is reduced,” but rather quite clearly sets forth the object of maximizing “the intelligibility of the contents of the index information.” Thus, Burrows actually teaches against “obfuscating at least a portion of the index information so that the intelligibility of the contents of the index information is reduced.”

For at least the foregoing reasons, the rejections of 1 and 12, and also claims 2-11 and 13-18 depending therefrom respectively, should be withdrawn.

II. Claims 19-24

A. “said web server operable to manage a content owners secure graphical or audio objects . . . wherein search engine systems are denied access to said objects”

Claim 19 recites in part “said web server operable to manage a content owner’s secure graphical or audio objects . . . wherein search engine systems are denied access to said objects.” As discussed above, neither Burrows nor Stark teaches or suggests “secure graphical or audio objects.” Further, the Examiner acknowledged that Burrows does not disclose that “search engines are denied access to [secure graphical or audio] objects,” and cited Stark to compensate for the acknowledged deficiency of Burrows. However, Stark does not teach that search engine systems are denied access to any objects. Instead, as discussed above, Stark teaches a robot.txt file that does not deny a search engine system access to any resource but rather lists resources that a web administrator requests the search engine system not to access. The search engine system may choose to honor the robot.txt file or it may choose to access resources listed in the robot.txt file. In either case, resources listed in the robot.txt file may be accessed by the search engine system. Thus, at least for the reasons stated herein, Stark does not teach or suggest that “search engines are denied access to [secure graphical or audio] objects.”

Claim 19, and also claims 20-24 depending therefrom, are allowable over the cited prior art and the rejections of these claims should be withdrawn for at least the foregoing reasons.

B. “. . . wherein the secure graphical or audio object is secure and that the search engine system does not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object ”

Claim 19 recites in part “wherein the secure graphical or audio object is secure and that the search engine system does not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object.” For the reasons stated above, neither Burrows nor Stark, either alone or in combination, teaches or suggests this recitation in claim 19. Therefore, claim 19, and also

claims 20-24 depending therefrom, are allowable over the cited prior art and the rejections of these claims should be withdrawn for at least the foregoing reasons.

III. Claims 25-27: “wherein search engine systems do not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object”

Claim 25 recites in part “converting at least a portion of a secure graphical or audio object into index information . . . wherein search engine systems do not have full access to the secure graphical or audio object.” For the reasons stated above, neither Burrows nor Stark, either alone or in combination, teaches or suggests this recitation in claim 25. Therefore, claim 25, and also claims 26-27 depending therefrom, are allowable over the cited prior art and the rejections of these claims should be withdrawn for at least the foregoing reasons.

CONCLUSION

All rejections have been addressed. In view of the above, the presently pending claims are believed to be in condition for allowance. Accordingly, reconsideration and allowance are respectfully requested and the Examiner is respectfully requested to pass this application to issue. It is believed that any fees associated with the filing of this paper are identified in an accompanying transmittal. However, if any additional fees are required, they may be charged to Deposit Account 18-0013, under order number 66703-0002. To the extent necessary, a petition for extension of time under 37 C.F.R. 1.136(a) is hereby made, the fee for which should be charged against the aforementioned account.

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Respectfully submitted,

Electronic signature: /Michael B. Stewart/
Michael B. Stewart
Registration No.: 36,018
RADER, FISHMAN & GRAUER PLLC
Correspondence Customer Number: 25537
Attorney for Applicant